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Abstract- The Sovereign Military Hospital/er Order of St. John of Jerusa-
lem of Rhodes and of Malta, frequently referred to as the Religion or the 
Hospital, is a particular institution. Recognised by Pope Paschal II in 
1113, this centuries old Order had a double raison d'etre- To offer hospi-
tality to Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem and to pursue the Holy War against 
the Infidel. However, the fall of Acre to the Saracens in 1291, made it 
impossible for the Hospitallers to fulfil/ their original vocation. After the 
capture and transformation of Rhodes into their base, they had to find a 
way of justifying their existence. They quickly came up with a characteris-
tic answer- to wage naval war against Islam. So successful did the Knights 
become in this new role that the marine branch of the Order :s- military 
activities was to come to the greatest prominence, in Rhodes and later in 
Malta. What were the characteristics of the Order :s- nary? Small numbers, 
excellent design and an enviable tradition became the chief qualities of 
this small but effective nary. What, however, did the Hospitallers do with 
their galleys? Did they wage war on I slam? Or did their activities degen-
erate into privateering? This issue is hotly debated by historians of the 
Order. European Historians have a habit of shuddering away from accus-
ing the Hospitallers of indulging in the corso, as corsairing is known in 
this context. This paper examines the topic in an attempt to unravel what 
has become a veritable Gordian knot. 
Introduction 
Since the dawn of civilization, dark deeds and tales of derring-do have 
always fascinated mankind. As such, tales of piracy and privateering have 
simultaneously chilled and delighted countless generations. The breath-
taking daring of a Drake or a Sir Henry Morgan, the black deeds of a 
Barbarossa or a Dragut and the literary delights of Long John Silver and 
Captain James Hook are all part of a tradition reaching back to Greek 
myths such as Jason's expedition for the Golden Fleece and Homer's Od-
yssey. 
The Mediterranean has only relatively recently been purged of the tor-
ment of the corsairs. Since classical times, piracy has been the scourge of 
the Inland Sea. From the corsair republic of Cilicia in classical times to 
the corsair states of North Mrica and Europe, such as Valletta, Leghorn 
and Pisa, these reckless brigands of the sea have carved their crime stained 
legends on both the Europeans and Mediterraneans alike, thus, in doing 
so, providing ample material for scrutiny and criticism. 
The advent of Islam imparted a new impetus to this age old profession 
by providing a framework of sanctimoniousness within the parameters of 
a J ihad (the Just War of the Hospitallers ), effective I y granting moral justi-
fication for what was already an extremely appealing way of life. Now, 
by having pandered to the veneer of civilization that stops most men from 
indulging wholesale the mo.re reprehensible modes of behaviour, Christi-
anity and Islam had condemned man to several centuries more of legal-
ised brigandage. 
Mter the expulsion of the last Moors from Granada in 1492 and the 
conquest of Rhodes in 1522, the political situation in the Mediterranean 
flared up dramatically. On one side of the Mediterranean, the dispos-
sessed Moriscoes of Spain faced making the hard choice between starva-
tion or resorting to the corso, while the fall of Rhodes finally gave the 
Turks unrestricted access to the sea, thus paving the way for them to play 
a much greater role in the politics of the Mediterranean. In a matter of 30 
years the North-Western region of the Mediterranean found itself under 
siege from the very virile and desperate corsairs by sea and the might of 
the Turkish Army by land. However, by 1574, owing to the Hapsburg 
recapture of Tunis and La Goletta, the powder keg created by Christen-
dom's precarious situation, was appreciably defused to the extent that 
Salvatore Bono (l993 : 358) feels justified in writing that by this time was 
produced 
An equilibrium between the two rival blocs ... with Turkey and Spain 
swiftly diverted away from the Mediterranean by the force of other threats 
and more pressing problems elsewhere, the grand old sea faded says 
Braudel "out of the limelight" of history. 
It is upon this canvas, a background of gradual decline, that the author 
purposes to tackle a major historiographical problem, of this "minor and 
anarchic" war in the Mediterranean, through the sources of secondary lit-
erature. One hardly needs to describe how valuable such sources can be as 
a gauge of the mentality that produced them and on those other works that 
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made use of them. As befits the scope of this work, this paper will be 
focusing in particular on the public participation of the Hospitallers in the 
corso. 
Were the Hospitallers corsairs? 
A major problem faced by historians is whether and to what extent the 
Hospitallers were corsairs. Can one correctly define all those expeditions 
that yield booty as corsair expeditions? Or do we have to stick to the 
formal definition of corsairing? The problems that lie here are manifold, 
particularly for the unwary, and this is the single most' glaring problem the 
author has encountered in this field during his researches on Hospitaller 
naval history. Many historians studying the corsairs may deal with either 
the Hospitallers as private or lay individuals or both, but very few deal 
with the Hospitallers as an Order. Indeed so intricately are the two issues 
combined that any scholar trying to assess the Order's formal participa-
tion in corsairing runs into very real difficulties. 
For the sake of clarity the author is going adopt Michel Fontenay's 
definition of corsairing, as it is the most exhaustive and pertinent and, due 
to this reason, it is going to be quoted in its entirety. Michel Fontenay 
(1975 : 78) says that: 
The corsair ... works privately on his own account (whence his Eng-
lish appellation: Privateer), but recognized by the law of man, he makes 
part of the armed forces of the country whose flag he flies. Thus, the 
corso, was effectively a compromise between individual and state interest: 
It was for this last reason that he was particularly eager to get rid of his 
prizes through commerce which in this respect (and others) was an essen-
tial activity. This results in two main distinctive characteristics of 
privateering: 
1. It was only pos:Yible during times of war, which makes us conclude 
that far from being the norm, it is a sporadic activity. 
2. An essential part of international law, thanks to the evolution of 
neutrals' rights, was that privateering was directed exclusively against 
the enemy. 
Henceforth any use of the word "corsair" and "corso" will refer to 
Fontenay's definition while piracy will be used to describe such illegiti-
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mate activity as preying on all and sundry, regardless of state, faith and 
race. Incidentally, the first characteristic of Fontenay's definition is still in 
keeping with the Hospitaller corsair war, because for the Hospitallers the 
enemy was the infidel and thus in this respect, the war perpetual. 
This definition might be expected to solve the problem of the Order's 
participation in the corso because according to Michel Fontenay (1975 : 
78), corsairing is the domain of the private individual. Unfortunately it does 
not, as in another work of his, Michel Fontenay (1988 : 365) says that: 
The study of the instructions of the Grand Master to the captains and 
generals of the galleys show that there were three types of belligerent 
missions ... the third of which was and these were the most frequent, ordi-
nary missions of this type, to corseggiare a danno d 'infedeli. 
This is undoubtedly an anomaly as with very few exceptions, no for-
mal navy engaged in practices so manifestly individual. In fact, it clearly 
contradicts Fontenay's (1975 : 78) definition in that "the corsair works 
privately on his own account". Numerous examples can be given of this. 
Probably the most famous example to spring to mind is the notorious Sir 
Francis Drake who, whilst occasionally serving in the queen's navy, cer-
tainly falls into this category as any privateering he indulged in, was on 
his own account. In fact it was only the wiliness of the queen's decision to 
knight him that obtained, for the crown, a proportion of the spoil he cap-
tured during his circumnavigation of the globe. 
As Peter Earle (1970: 107) observes, amongst the exceptions to this 
general rule were the Barbary Corsairs, for whom the distinction in or-
ganization between state-owned and private ships was non-existent. In the 
anarchical state of affairs that prevailed on the North African coast, a ra-
pacious though skillful freebooter such as Kheyr-ed Din Barbarossa would 
find the throne of a territory, or city, ripe for him to take, creating a situa-
tion wherein it becomes impossible to define precisely where State inter-
ests end and private interests begin. This, however, is not applicable to the 
Hospitallers who were a (relatively) law-abiding order and even if they 
were not disposed to respect the law, financial considerations would -and 
indeed did- prove effective at keeping them in a reasonable frame of mind. 
From this perspective, the very specific Magistral instructions are very 
surprising indeed, especially as there were no lack of adventurous charac-
ters on the island willing to supply the proper corsair element and a cut of 
their profits to the government. 
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~ it is an undoubted fact that the Hospitallers, both on private owned 
ships and on the Order's galleys did practise corsairing, many historians 
do not deny it but seek instead to exculpate the Order from the "crimes" 
committed by its members, on one ground or another. Peter Earle (1970: 
107) states that the reason he considers the navy of the Order as a navy 
and not as corsairs is because the navy was "guilty of behaviour which 
could not be true of any self-respecting corsair. It did not make a profit!". 
This is contradicted by Schermahom (1929 : 227), who says that the Or-
der's navy had: 
The advantage of being largely self-supporting, of making one hand 
wash the other so to speak. For the rich booty, the captured cargoes and 
ships and the ransom or sale of Moslem slaves, supplied a substantial 
subsidy not only to the maintenance of the fleet but also to the order 
itself 
A few pages later on, Schermahom (1929 : 231) goes on to give an 
example of the importance of these noble corsairs, not only to the Maltese 
economy but even more so to the Order's, when in 1679, the GrandMas-
ter had to recall all corsairs sailing under the flag of St. John due to pres-
sure from Rome and Venice. These must have all been knights because 
the Grand Master threatened them with the loss of their habit if they failed 
to comply. However "the treasury would have become bankrupt without 
them, and they were soon re-armed". Michel Fontenay (1988: 365) has 
this to say on the matter: 
Many historians seek to exculpate the Order's naval activities from 
semantic and thematic association with corsairing on the grounds that the 
Order was a Sovereign state with its own politics and ideological 
motivations. However the Order itself did not bother overmuch with these 
scruples. The Magistral instructions are very clear: fare una scorribanda 
on the enemy coast in wait of di qualche buon effetto al profitto della 
nostra Sacra Religione et della Cristianita and the word 'profit' is not used 
figuratively: di qualche rica presa, di qualche guadagno. 
Approaching this problem from another angle demanded an examina-
tion of the mode of attack the HospitaJlers employed at sea. If they were, 
as many apologists insist, mainly employed in policing the seas against 
the infidel corsairs, one would expect this to be reflected in the type of 
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tactics they employed during battle, i.e. that of sinking their enemies. If 
on the other hand they were involved in active corsairing, then it is more 
likely that that they relied on boarding their prey. Unfortunately, one tends 
to find controversy even in this field. Salvatore Bono (1993 : 377) says 
that the firing capacity of the Hospitaller galley must have served solely to 
distract the enemy vessel. He goes on to say that it was important to make 
the largest number of men prisoners and therefore slaves and to take pos-
session of the ship's cargo. This, of course, is the behaviour of a corsair 
and thus Bono's view is directly at odds with what Sire (1994: 90) has to 
say: 
The Barbary vessels carried few guns and large crews, aiming at 
swarming aboard their victim and capturing it intact; the Maltese ships, 
by contrast, were more famous for their gunnery, since their ethos empha-
sized combat more than rapine. 
Sire's statement is fallacious both in substance and in implication. 
In the first place, it does not follow that the Maltese were famous for 
gunnery because their ethos emphasized combat more than rapine. It 
simply means that the Maltese crews had more practice in battle than 
their Barbary counterparts which, of course, makes sense if one consid-
ers that for the Hospitallers the corso was but one aspect of the whole 
war itself. Also the tone of Sire's statement implies that the Knights were 
more interested in keeping the waters clear from Barbary corsairs than 
corsairing for profit. This apologetic position is confuted by Fontenay's 
revelation in the paragraph above. Further investigation reveals that 
Sire lifted his statement almost bodily from Earle (1970 : 133), however 
Earle does not tell us that the Maltese relied on their excellent gunnery 
because they were out to sink and not loot, he merely states the fact that 
they relied heavily on artillery when they had to fight a battle against a 
well armed opponent and this is common sense as artillery is just as 
effective against personnel as it is against the vessels themselve~. In fact, 
the artillery's main function was to overwhelm the enemy defense or to 
disable a ship by shooting two hemispheres linked with a chain to de-
stroy the enemy ship's masts or oars. This naval tactic had been utilised 
since classical times when a galley would first shower its opponent with 
arrows and then board. It is true that artillery greatly reduces the number 
of slaves but it does not -usually - kill the passengers, probably cower-
ing below deck, who being more important than the crew would obtain a 
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higher ransom. Furthermore, the risk of damaging the cargo, well packed 
in the hold, was minimal. 
Further investigation reveals more lack of consensus. In the course of 
his research, the author got the impression that the Maltese were excellent 
gunners, probably due to the enthusiasm with which this point is usually 
emphasised. He was therefore intrigued to read in a work by Claire-Elaine 
Engel (1968: 228) that "the gunners of Malta were bad." This is quite a 
departure from the other views so an attempt was made to find further 
evidence of this in the pages of a work that focused entirely on the Maltese 
crews of the Order's ships, Ettore Rossi's I Maltesi Dell'Ordine Di San 
Giovanni but no mention was made of the quality of Maltese gunners. 
However, the importance of Engel's work lies in the fact that for her, there 
is no question about the corsairing activities of the Order. Unequivocally, 
Engel (1968 : 228) states that 
In Malta, corsairing was carried out in three different forms. In the 
first place, one had the fleet of the Order, flying the flag of Malta (white 
cross on a red background), commanded by the knights and manned by 
the slaves of the Order" 
Engel clearly distinguishes between the public and private corso of 
the knights because she goes on to describe the latter as the second form 
(the third form being private corso by the Maltese subjects of the Grand 
Master) and in fact her description of the Hospitaller mode of attack tal-
lies perfectly with her views: 
The attacks on enemy ships were every day more audacious. Board-
ing was the established rule of the day for quite a number of reasons: it 
was more dashing, the gunners of Malta were bad, and there was less risk 
of sending the booty to the bottom of the sea or of the enemy ship manag-
ing to escape. 
I find this the more plausible interpretation of the lot. Some of its 
component parts agree with those of other scholars like Salvatore Bono 
and I think that it fits in well with the available evidence. 
In an interesting postscript to the- Hospitaller private vs. public corso 
argument, in Schermahorn (1929 : 137), one reads of the Cardinal Grand 
Master Verdala's desire to send a galley on the corso and this appears to 
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have stirred up a hornet's nest. The Inquisitor Cefalotto complained about 
this saying that: 
The private corso is damaging to the public corso of the Order, be-
cause it takes the best slaves and interferes with the arming of the Reli-
gion's navy. 
On its own, this evidence would be very convincing on the subject, 
but taken together with the others, it seems to be a pretty damning indict-
ment. 
Conclusion 
If the evidence seems to make it clear that the Order had no hesitation in 
engaging in overt corsair activities, why do so many of its apologists 
insist on defending the Order from a charge the Hospitallers pleaded 
guilty to with disarming honesty? There are many reasons why authors 
and historians would seek to liberate the Order from the accusation of 
privateering and piracy and this is mainly due to the very negative fame 
of the Moslem C_orsairs1 -whose notoriety shines undimmed even today-
and to a jingoism that pervades the older works, particularly of amateur 
historians2 who, even when glorifying the cut -throat feats of the knights, 
insist on describing them as activities substantially more virtuous than 
those of their Moslem counterparts. There are also those who do so ei-
ther because they have some pretensions of association with the 
Hospitallers or are actually knights themselves. In this context one can 
mention people like Robert Von Dauber. By their omission and ambigu-
ity, such historians appear to feel, and certainly imply, that the participa-
tion of the knights in the "guerrue de cor se" proper is not worthy of the 
spirit of the sieges of Rhodes and Malta. As Engel (1968: 233) points 
out, the war of the corso, however, "was a political, economic and reli-
gious necessity for Malta" and thus, there is no reason why the public 
corso should be considered shameful or unworthy. 
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Dragut remains the best known villain in local folklore 
see Vincenzo Bonello's article on "La Marina Del'Ordine di Malta" for an excel-
lent example of this type of history. 
Joseph Anthony Debono obtained his first degree in history from the 
University of Malta. A teacher of Information Technology, he is currently 
reading for an MA in history. 
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